CHAPTER 1: ARBITRARY DETENTION

Chapter 1. Arbitrary Detention

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. International Legal Framework for Arbitrary Detention

III. Key Findings

1. Post-Ceasefire Civilian Detentions in Nagorno-Karabakh

Entrapment at the Hakari Bridge Checkpoint

Capture of Civilians Conducting Agricultural Work

2. Entrapment of Armenian Soldiers after the Ceasefire

Khtsaberd Detentions

Ishkhanasar Detentions

Detentions during September 2022 Attacks on Armenia

3. Violations of Due Process

IV. Conclusion

I. Introduction

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and since the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan has arbitrarily detained individuals in violation of both international humanitarian and human rights law. Hundreds of arbitrary detentions took place during active hostilities in 2020. Since the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement, and up until Azerbaijan's September 19, 2023 military offensive that resulted in Azerbaijan taking over the remaining territory of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Azerbaijan arbitrarily detained over 160 Armenians, including civilians and former soldiers. As of the date of this publication, at least 51 Armenians captured during or in the aftermath of the 44-Day War have remained in captivity.¹ 

[As we were publishing, on December 7, 2023, Azerbaijan announced that it would release 32 Armenian prisoners as part of a prisoner exchange with Armenia.²]

These numbers likely do not capture the full extent of captivity, given that at least some of the individuals who have at some point been considered missing have likely been forcibly disappeared by Azerbaijani state forces – that is, hidden in secret detention in military police or State Security Service (SSS) custody and subjected to brutal forms of torture. These Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) were held in undisclosed sites and in Baku prisons while Azerbaijan denied knowledge of detainees’ locations to their families, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Armenian government, despite video evidence that numerous individuals were in custody.

Captures of Armenian soldiers have occurred in places with no ongoing hostilities, as soldiers retreated from combat zones in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in contested border locations. For three years following the ceasefire, Azerbaijan has seized Armenians outside the scope of regular military operations, including by detaining Armenian civilians who accidentally crossed unmarked borders in disputed territory; detaining villagers as they tended to their land and herded their livestock; and capturing Armenian soldiers in groups through entrapment. The latter has occurred after surprising or luring Armenian soldiers by feigning good-faith negotiations.

Azerbaijani forces have also subjected Armenians to grave violations of basic due process rights after detaining them, including by filing spurious charges such as illegally crossing a border in the context of a territorial dispute; using coerced self-incriminating testimony; and denying access to interpreters, adequate legal representation, and trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.

The unlawful capture and detention of members of the armed forces and civilians, before and after the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, has been widely documented by various national and international human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, the Office of the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Armenia, and the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), among others.³

Fact-finding by the University Network for Human Rights (University Network or UNHR) contributes to this body of documentation with first-hand accounts from returned prisoners of war who were detained subsequent to the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement both in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Republic of Armenia. In addition to describing the initial capture, we outline the subsequent violations of due process rights. We also analyze relevant legal norms and obligations, as well as existing research and scholarship on arbitrary detentions. 

II. International Legal Framework for Arbitrary Detention

Arbitrary detention is the arrest and deprivation of liberty of a person without legal authorization or judicial protections. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention maintains that deprivation of liberty – defined as “whenever a person is being held without his or her free consent” – is an arbitrary detention when: (1) there is no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) it results from the exercise of specific rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); (3) it violates international norms relating to the right to a fair trial; (4) it involves subjecting migrants to prolonged custody without a possibility of review or remedy; or (5) it constitutes a violation of international law based on discrimination against protected groups. The UN Working Group further asserts that arbitrary detention generally includes “elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.”⁴

Various international instruments prohibit arbitrary detention. The ICCPR, which Azerbaijan ratified in 1992, establishes that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention” and that “no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.”⁵ The treaty further imposes obligations on States regarding the treatment of those detained. Article 10 of the ICCPR declares that

Article 14 of the ICCPR codifies basic due process rights for detainees, ensuring that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals” and that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”⁸ The treaty enshrines the fundamental guarantee that all people are innocent until proven guilty. The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers echoes these protections, maintaining that “all persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice,” while both the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the UN Human Rights Committee, the treaty body of the ICCPR, have stated that trials must not involve threats, pressures, or interferences, including “political interference by the executive branch and legislature” as well as “any form of political influence in their decision-making.”⁹

III. Key findings

1. Post-Ceasefire Civilian Detentions in Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijani forces have arbitrarily detained civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh after the November 10, 2020 ceasefire. In the period immediately following the ceasefire, civilian detentions have resulted largely from the ensuing confusion about the new location of de facto borders. Ethnic Armenian civilians have stumbled upon Azerbaijani forces as they traversed familiar roads that days or hours earlier had fallen under the control of Azerbaijan's military. Azerbaijani forces have then detained the Armenians and transferred them to be tried and imprisoned in Azerbaijan.¹⁰

After the initial post-ceasefire period passed, and up until Azerbaijan's September 19, 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, civilian detentions have involved either entrapment at the Lachin Corridor border crossing (also referred to as the Hakari Bridge Checkpoint) or capture in agricultural or grazing lands in close proximity to the new Azerbaijani military positions. Detentions of civilians in agricultural lands near border regions are also discussed in this report's Forced Displacement chapter, specifically in relation to intimidation of border communities, attacks on livelihood, and endangerment of food security.

Entrapment at the Hakari Bridge Checkpoint

On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan set up a checkpoint at the Hakari Bridge, thereby blocking the Lachin Corridor, the one passage between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.¹¹ Azerbaijan’s president declared that the border checkpoint “should be a lesson” to Armenians.¹² Over the following months, Azerbaijani state forces took advantage of their oversight of the border crossing to arrest ethnic Armenians attempting to cross into Armenia on spurious accusations.¹³

On July 29, 2023, Azerbaijani forces detained Vagif Khachatryan, a 68-year-old man from the Patara community of Nagorno-Karabakh, at the Hakari Bridge checkpoint. Khachatryan was part of an ICRC medical convoy and his detention was carried out in the presence of ICRC representatives. Azerbaijani officials seized Khachatryan’s passport and brought him to a medical office, where they subjected him to abusive interrogation. They threatened to use force against him, his daughter, and the ICRC representative if he did not comply. Azerbaijani officials then took Khachatryan away in a car to an undisclosed location. At that time, the ICRC representative who had been with Khachatryan was transported by Azerbaijani forces back to the Hakari Bridge. Following Khachatryan’s detention, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against him, accusing him of involvement in what Azerbaijani officials refer to as the “Meshalinka massacre” of 1991. On November 7, 2023, an Azerbaijani court sentenced Khachatryan to a 15-year prison term.¹⁴

Approximately one month after Khachatryan's detention, Azerbaijani forces detained three young students at the Hakari Bridge border checkpoint, accusing them of disrespecting the Azerbaijani flag in a social media video from 2021.¹⁵ The Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh reported that all three students had been included in a pre-agreed list for crossing the checkpoint. An Azerbaijani court later sentenced the three students to a ten-day jail term.¹⁶

According to a range of sources, including representatives of the ICRC, and consistent with University Network researchers' experience entering Nagorno-Karabakh in March 2022, since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijani authorities have reviewed and approved lists of the names of individuals who seek to enter and exit Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia via the Lachin Corridor. This practice was in place even before the installation of the checkpoint at the Hakari Bridge. Azerbaijani border officials were thus not only aware of, but knowingly facilitated, the arrival of Khachatryan and a month later, the three students, at the Hakari Bridge checkpoint, where they subsequently detained them and charged them with crimes in Azerbaijan.

Capture of Civilians Conducting Agricultural Work

Attacks on civilians conducting agricultural work in border regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia have become increasingly commonplace since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, largely due to the proximity of Azerbaijani positions to Armenian residential areas whose local economies and subsistence depend heavily on agriculture and livestock. The examples below are meant to illustrate this phenomenon, but do not even approach demonstrating its scale.

On July 19, 2021, in the village of Tegh in the Syunik region of Armenia, a man crossed the invisible demarcation line into an area under the control of Azerbaijan’s armed forces with his tractor. After the man returned to his own land, Azerbaijani soldiers entered Armenian territory and detained the man and seized his tractor. The commander of the Russian forces stationed in the area, the commander of the army corps of the Armed Forces of Armenia, and representatives of Azerbaijan engaged in five hours of negotiations to have the man and his equipment returned.¹⁷ A similar incident was reported to the Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh on July 22, 2021. A resident of the Aygestan village of the Askeran district lost his way in the area of ​​the Khramort municipality and crossed into an area controlled by Azerbaijan. After hours of mediation by the Russian forces, Azerbaijani officials eventually returned the man.¹⁸

In July 2021, the staff of the Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh received an alert regarding the arbitrary detention of Artak, a 32-year-old resident of the Machkalashen community in the Martuni Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The cattleman was captured by Azerbaijani soldiers after he apparently crossed inadvertently into territory under Azerbaijani control while searching for a lost cow. The municipal authorities appealed to the Russian forces to have the man returned safely. Following significant mediation, Azerbaijan eventually released the man.¹⁹ Four months later, in the Martuni region of Nagorno-Karabakh, local authorities reported that a 21-year-old Armenian lost his way and found himself in Azerbaijani-controlled territory. His release three days later seemed to result from negotiations conducted with Russian forces.²⁰

Again, the examples above are only illustrative of what appears to have become an extremely common practice since 2021 through the present. We present additional first-hand accounts of intimidation of civilians in agricultural and grazing lands in this report's chapter on Forced Displacement.

2. Entrapment of Armenian Soldiers after the Ceasefire

Since the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijani forces have captured Armenian soldiers in groups through entrapment. On at least two occasions documented by University Network researchers, these group arrests took place by surprising or luring in Armenian soldiers by feigning good-faith negotiations.

Armenian human rights lawyer Siranoush Sahakyan told our research team that, during active hostilities, “the logic was to terrify the Armenian side through extrajudicial killings. The strategy changed during peacetime.”²¹ Indeed, the University Network's independent collection and review of data on arbitrary detentions during and after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War indicate that most of the individuals captured by Azerbaijani forces during active hostilities were killed, while many of those captured after the November 10, 2020 ceasefire were taken captive. Those in the latter category either remain imprisoned in Azerbaijan or were eventually sent back to Armenia. 

One theory behind the shift in the modus operandi vis-á-vis the capture of Armenians is that after the cessation of open combat, Azerbaijan sought to amass and leverage Armenian hostages in negotiations; as Azerbaijani human rights activist Arif Yunusov observed in a phone interview with UNHR, the Azerbaijani government’s strategy at some point after the November ceasefire became dominated by the use of Armenian captives as “business opportunities” to advance Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's political goals.²² In a similar vein, Armenian authorities have accused Azerbaijan of using Armenian POWs as “bargaining chips."²³

First-hand accounts of the moment of capture are consistent with these analyses. At least two incidents of post-ceasefire mass arrests include an element of deception on the part of Azerbaijani forces to lure Armenians who surrendered into circumstances that ultimately facilitated their capture and transfer to Baku, where most were charged and tried for criminal offenses.

Khtsaberd Detentions

One of the most widely documented cases of Azerbaijan’s mass capture of Armenian soldiers took place in the village of Khtsaberd in Nagorno-Karabakh. The capture took place over several days in mid-December 2020, nearly one month after the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Armenians commonly refer to the group of 62 soldiers captured there as the “Khtsaberd group.” 

The lawyers representing members of the Khtsaberd group explained to the University Network that, despite promises from Azerbaijani authorities that the captured Armenian troops would be released immediately, all but 20 of the soldiers remained in captivity for months or years. Azerbaijan brought criminal charges against the remaining 42 soldiers in February 2021, followed by convictions in July and August 2021, with sentences ranging from six months to 20 years in prison.²⁴

Some of those convicted have been repatriated to Armenia. Of those sentenced to six months, 15 were released to Armenia in June and July of 2021. Five more were reportedly repatriated to Armenia on October 19, 2021. As mentioned above, the release of an additional 32 prisoners was announced on December 7, 2023. According to the most recent report from an Armenian organization closely tracking the situation of Armenian prisoners in Azerbaijan, until that exchange takes place, at least 51 Armenians remain in detention in Baku.²⁵

Matevos, one of the soldiers from the Khtsaberd group who was ultimately repatriated, described to University Network researchers the events that led to the group's capture.²⁶

Matevos explained that his group negotiated with the Azerbaijani soldiers over the course of an hour while the Armenian and Azerbaijan troops stood across from each other at a crossroads. The Armenians decided to believe the Azerbaijani soldiers’ assurances that they would escort the group to the Russian forces, and so they agreed to the Azerbaijani soldiers’ conditions: handing over their weapons and personal belongings. 

Matevos was among 36 Armenian soldiers from the Khtsaberd Group who were sentenced to six years of imprisonment.²⁷ Azerbaijan offered no explanation for Matevos’ release 10 months after his initial capture.

Ishkhanasar Detentions

University Network researchers also spoke with Hagop,²⁸ a returned Armenian POW, on the eve of his redeployment. Hagop was released to Armenia six weeks after his capture on November 16, 2021 (one year and seven days after the signing of the ceasefire agreement). 

On November 14, 2021, Hagop observed Azerbaijani troops gathering artillery from his unit’s elevated position in Ishkhanasar, a mountain in the southern part of Armenia. He watched as Azerbaijani soldiers took over other Armenian positions nearby. Eventually, the Azerbaijani soldiers surrounded his group and displayed maps delineating borders and accusing the Armenians of settling 40 meters within Azerbaijani territory. Hagop recalled,

Finally, on November 16, 2021, around 1:00 p.m., Hagop saw about 30 members of the Azerbaijan Special Forces approach their group while saying in Russian,

The Special Forces alerted the Armenians that an Azerbaijani officer wished to speak to the group. Together, the 13 Armenian soldiers agreed to descend from their position to approach the officer. “We were first taken to a post containing about 60 Azerbaijani soldiers who claimed that the commander was actually located at a second position. They asked some Armenian soldiers to remain at the first post while a few continued on to the second.

Hagop was among at least 30 Armenian troops who were taken captive by Azerbaijani forces in the southern Syunik region between November 14 and 16, 2021.³² Hagop remained in captivity until December 29, 2022.

Detentions during September 2022 Attacks on Armenia

Arbitrary detentions continued during Azerbaijan's September 2022 attacks on eastern Armenia. In Jermuk, 19-year-old Edgar³³ and three other conscripts lost contact with their unit hours earlier. They then spent the night wading through streams and dodging sniper fire, trying to make their way back to Jermuk city. In the early morning, they were already far from the frontlines, deep within Armenian territory, so they decided to rest before the final leg of their trek, especially because one of them was seriously injured. They awoke to find that Azerbaijani troops had encircled them at gunpoint.

Around the same time, 128 kilometers away, Azerbaijani forces captured at least nine Armenian soldiers in the area of Sev Lake, in the Iskhanasar Massif where Hagop had been captured nearly two years prior. Azerbaijanis posted a video of their execution of the captives two years earlier, lined up next to each other on their knees, while one of their Azerbaijani captors gunned them down.³⁵ This incident is discussed in greater detail in this report's section on Extrajudicial Killings. Separately, Armenian media reported that Azerbaijani forces had taken a total of 20 prisoners during that same time period.³⁶ 

The circumstances and motives underlying the capture and subsequent detentions of Armenian civilians and soldiers, whether in Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, whether days or years after the conclusion of the 2020 War, and whether the captives were ultimately released to Armenia or are still in Azerbaijani custody, warrant serious investigation.

This possibility should be of grave concern to the international community: that Azerbaijani state forces have been arbitrarily detaining Armenian civilians to intimidate border communities into fleeing and have been capturing Armenian troops to use as leverage in bilateral and international negotiations.

3. Violations of Due Process

Azerbaijani forces have subjected Armenians to due process violations after detaining them, including spurious charges such as illegally crossing a border in the context of a territorial dispute; use of coerced self-incriminating testimony; and lack of access to interpreters, adequate legal representation, and trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Despite Azerbaijan’s continued arbitrary detention of Armenian soldiers captured after the ceasefire, Azerbaijan has officially denied prisoner of war status to Armenian detainees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan published the following statement in 2021 justifying its decision:

In interviews with returned detainees and their lawyers, and upon thorough review of reports published by the Human Rights Defender of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Human Rights Defender of Armenia, University Network researchers found that, within the same group of detainees, some have been charged as terrorists and others were immediately returned to Armenia without any charges. Moreover, among those charged, some have been held until trial, while others have been returned before their case went to trial. Furthermore, some of those convicted have even been sent back to Armenia. Thus, not only the detentions themselves, but also the criminal proceedings accompanying them, have proven arbitrary with respect to Azerbaijan’s application of the law.

The Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh qualifies these trials as “illegal prosecutions” because the victims were captured “during active hostilities and after the ceasefire.”³⁸ The Human Rights Defender's report also describes how captives have been subjected to threats, manipulation and mistreatment or torture, including beatings and deprivation of food and water, to pressure them to provide false confessions or to sign documents they did not understand. (The documents were written in Azeri, and Azerbaijani officials did not provide the Armenian captives with translators or translations of the documents.)³⁹

Along similar lines, Armenian human rights lawyer Sahakyan, who represents a number of Armenian detainees, has argued that “a charge of illegal border crossing is absurd in the context of a territorial dispute,”⁴⁰ and explained to UNHR why they consider these to be sham trials:

"Because a public political declaration preceded the proceedings, because of the discriminatory and arbitrary approach in convictions, because a charge of 'illegal border crossing' is absurd in the context of a territorial dispute."

Sahakyan went on, "In addition, there is the matter of the court proceedings themselves: the Azerbaijani judges are not impartial … [cites prior European Court of Human Rights rulings and describes how crimes against Armenians are treated as heroism in Azerbaijan] … , and Armenians are not allowed to have their own lawyers.⁴¹

Indeed, the Azerbaijani human rights organization Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), which has observed these trials, has published extensive analyses of the violations of due process involved. For example, regarding the trials held on July 2, 2021 of the groups of Armenian soldiers captured in December 2020, IPD concluded that “the court’s verdict stated that the trial was held openly, but in reality, the court effectively deprived the defendants of their right to a public trial and the journalists wishing to cover the trial objectively of their right to obtain and share any kind of information.” Additionally, because the “defendants’ guilt was not proven” and there was no “clear and sufficient evidentiary [sic] basis, the defendants’ right to liberty was violated.”⁴²

In IPD’s analysis of the trial of an Armenian captured near Shushi (Shusha) in November, just days after the signing of the ceasefire, the organization also wrote:

Yunusov, who serves as chief of the Conflictology and Migration Department of IPD, described to the University Network how Armenian detainees had the cards stacked against them from the moment they were captured.

The accounts shared with University Network researchers by lawyers representing Armenian detainees corroborate IPD’s observations. Sahakyan recounted how her team requested but was denied access to its clients because Azerbaijan’s Public Defender’s Office offered Armenian captives representation. Sahakyan’s team’s clients were forced to provide self-incriminating testimony through various means (see Chapter 2: Torture) and contact was sparse due to the absence of a secure medium of communication between the captives and their lawyers. 

Beyond systemic bias against Armenians, international institutions have expressed serious concerns with the independence of Azerbaijan's judiciary more generally. According to Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2022 Report, in Azerbaijan “constitutional guarantees of due process are not upheld. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, and detainees are often held for long periods before trial.”⁴⁵ These concerns are not recent. In 2017, the Council of Europe had called upon the Azerbaijani government “to pursue the reforms of the judiciary and the prosecution service to strengthen their independence and restore confidence in the justice system.”⁴⁶ Thus, deep-seated anti-Armenian sentiment combined with severe shortcomings in Azerbaijan's judicial system led Armenian captives in Azerbaijani custody to suffer rampant due process violations.

IV. Conclusion

After the formal conclusion of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has continued to arbitrarily detain Armenians from both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh– over 160 individuals at the time of writing. Azerbaijan has seized Armenian civilians and soldiers outside the scope of regular military operations, including by detaining civilians who accidentally crossed unmarked borders in disputed territory; by detaining villagers as they tended to their land and herded their livestock; and by capturing Armenian soldiers in groups through entrapment, after surprising or luring them in by feigning good-faith negotiations. Azerbaijani forces also have subjected Armenians to due process violations after detaining them, including by leveling spurious charges such as illegally crossing a border in the context of a territorial dispute; using coerced self-incriminating testimony; and denying access to interpreters, adequate legal representation, and trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.

There are likely many more experiences of captivity that have not been documented. It is impossible for many victims of arbitrary detention to share their stories, in particular those captives who were subsequently victims of extrajudicial killing, those who still remain in detention with little to no access to the outside world, and those who have been forcibly disappeared. 

Endnotes:

1. Center for Truth and Justice, “Azerbaijan Must Release All Armenian Political Prisoners, POWs, and Hostages,” November 21, 2023, https://www.cftjustice.org/azerbaijan-must-release-all-armenian-political-prisoners-pows-and-hostages/.

2. “Joint Statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” December 7, 2023, https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2023/12/07/Announcement/.

3. Lokshina, Tanya. 2021. “Survivors of unlawful detention in Nagorno-Karabakh speak out about war crimes.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/12/survivors-unlawful-detention-nagorno-karabakh-speak-out-about-war-crimes; International Crisis Group. 2020. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer; Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. 2023. “Report on the Violations of Individual and Collective Human Rights as a Result of Azerbaijan’s Blockade of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). Six Months.” Artsakh Ombudsman. https://artsakhombuds.am/en/document/1028; International Committee of the Red Cross. 2021. “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Offering a lifeline to families of detained people.” https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-connecting-families-detainees.

4. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. “About arbitrary detention.” OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-arbitrary-detention.

5. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, 16 December 1966, United Nations, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights [hereinafter ICCPR].

6.  ICCPR, art. 10

7.  ICCPR, art. 9

8. ICCPR, art. 14

9. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27–September 7, 1990, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RoleOfLawyers.aspx; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, para. 19, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Human-Rights-Committee-General-Comments-equality-before-courts-and-tribunals-report-CCPR-C-GC-32-2007-eng.pdf;“Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary” (1985), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-independence-judiciary.

10. Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. 2021. “Interim report on malicious prosecution by Azerbaijan of captured Armenian servicemen and civilians.” https://artsakhombuds.am/ru/document/879.

11. Chiappa, Claudia, Pierre E. Ngendakumana, and Gabriel Gavin. 2023. “Azerbaijan installs checkpoint on road to Nagorno-Karabakh amid fatal clashes.” Politico.edu. https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-installs-checkpoint-on-road-to-nagorno-karabakh-amid-fatal-clashes/.

12. Aliyev, Ilham. 2023. “Ilham Aliyev met with people who returned to the city of Lachin and presented house keys to them » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic.” President.az. https://president.az/en/articles/view/60027.

13.  Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. 2023. “Facts collected by the Ombudsman‘s Office about the kidnapping of Vagif Khachatryan by Azerbaijan.” Twitter. https://twitter.com/ArtsakhOmbuds/status/1685367128080203777.

14.  Bayram, Aliyev K. 2023. “Internationally wanted fugitive of Meshali massacre detained.” genprosecutor.gov.az. https://genprosecutor.gov.az/az/post/6619; APA. 2023. “Armenian criminal Vagif Khachatryan was sentenced to 15 years in prison- Updated-5-Video.” APA. https://en.apa.az/incident/armenian-criminal-vagif-khachatryan-was-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison-updated-5-video-415746.

15. Bayram, Aliyev K. 2021. “The Prosecutor General has launched a criminal case regarding the fact that Armenian football players committed offensive actions against the national flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” genprosecutor.gov.az. https://genprosecutor.gov.az/az/post/4644.

16. “Azerbaijani Media Report Arrest of Three Armenians in Lachin Corridor,” Armenpress, August 28, 2023, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1118234.html; General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 2023. “Armenian football players detained at the Lachin border post have been arrested.” Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/prokurorluq/posts/information-of-the-press-service-of-the-prosecutor-generals-office-of-the-republ/709134777919270/.

17. Badalyan, Susan. 2021. “A tractor driver from the village of Tegh “violated” the border by 10 meters and caused 5-hour trilateral negotiations.” Радио Азатутюн [Azatutyun Radio]. https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/31367199.html.

18. Armen Press. 2021. “Artsakh's citizen who was lost and entered the territory under Azerbaijani control has been returned.” armenpress.am. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1058864/.

19. Stepanyan, Gegham. July 26, 2021. https://www.facebook.com/gegham.stepanian/posts/3904332026362849.

20. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia. 2023. “Release.” mil.am. https://mil.am/en/news/10146; Republic of Artsakh National Security Service. 2023. “The National Security Service of the Republic of Artsakh is Taking Measures to Return the Artsakh Citizen Who Appeared under the Control of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan as a Result of Going Astray.” nssartsakh.am. http://www.nssartsakh.am/hy/news/arcaxi-hanrapetutyan-azgayin-anvtangutyan-carayutyun-mijocner-e-jernarkum-molorvelu-ardyunkum-adrbejani-zinvac-uzeri-verahskogutyan-tak-haytnvac-arcaxcun-veradarjnelu-uggutyamb.

21. Siranoush Sahakyan, interview with UNHR, Yerevan, March 2023.

22.  Arif Yunusov, phone interview with UNHR, February 14, 2023.

23. Mejlumyan, Ani. 2021. “A year after war, Armenian prisoners still bargaining chips in Azerbaijan.” Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/a-year-after-war-armenian-prisoners-still-bargaining-chips-in-azerbaijan.

24. Sahakyan, interview, 2023.

25. Center for Truth and Justice, “Azerbaijan Must Release All Armenian Political Prisoners, POWs, and Hostages,” November 21, 2023, https://www.cftjustice.org/azerbaijan-must-release-all-armenian-political-prisoners-pows-and-hostages/.

26. Name has been altered for privacy and security reasons.

27. Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. 2021. “Interim report on malicious prosecution by Azerbaijan of captured Armenian servicemen and civilians.”

28. Name has been altered for privacy and security reasons.

29. Hagop, interview with UNHR, Armenia, March 17, 2022.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. EVN Report. 2022. “2021: The Post-War Year.” evnreport.com. https://evnreport.com/politics/2021-the-post-war-year/.

33. Name has been altered for privacy and security reasons.

34. Edgar, UNHR Interview in Armenia, March 23, 2022.

35. Gonzales, Carlos. 2022. “An Execution Near Sev Lake - bellingcat.” Bellingcat. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2022/10/20/an-execution-near-sev-lake-armenia-azerbaijan/.

36. Sahakyan, interview, March 2023.

37. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. 2021. “No:102/21, Commentary by the Press Service Department of the MFA of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the alleged cases of mistreatment with Armenian POWs as reported by Human Rights Watch.” https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no10221-commentary-by-the-press-service-department-of-the-mfa-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan-on-the-alleged-cases-of-mistreatment-with-armenian-pows-as-reported-by-human-rights-watch.

38. Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. 2021. “Interim report on malicious prosecution by Azerbaijan of captured Armenian servicemen and civilians.”

39. Ibid.

40. Sahakyan, interview, 2022.

41. Ibid.

42. Institute for Peace and Democracy. 2021. “The Trials of Armenian Prisoners of War are Held Behind Closed Doors.” Institute for Peace and Democracy. https://www.ipd-az.org/the-trials-over-the-armenian-prisoners-of-war-are-held-behind-closed-doors/.

43. Institute for Peace and Democracy. 2021. “The Court Violated Both the Norms of Azerbaijani Legislation as well as Those of the International Law in Relation to the Armenian Prisoner of War.” Institute for Peace and Democracy. https://www.ipd-az.org/the-court-violated-both-the-norms/.

44. Yunusov, interview.

45. Freedom House. 2022. “Azerbaijan: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-world/2022.

46.  Schennach, Stefan, Cezar F. Preda, and Nils Muižnieks. 2017. “The functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan.” ecoi.net. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1410091/1226_1506433011_the-functioning-of-democratic-institutions-in-azerbaijan.pdf.